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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
Enforcement of the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial
The basic nature of the right to a speedy trial is disclosed by its deep
roots in the early common law. Perhaps the earliest procedural devel-
opment to give effect to the right is found in the common law commis-
sion of jail delivery of the 14th century by which jails were emptied
twice each year and prisoners either convicted and punished or delivered
from custody.' The English Habeas Corpus Act2 in 1680 was the next
development, and it served as the model for numerous state statutes
giving effect to the right, such as the Illinois "Four Term" Act.3
In the United States the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by
federal and state constitutions. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy,
and public trial . . . ,,4 Although the Sixth Amendment applies only
to criminal prosecutions in the federal courts,5 the right to a speedy
trial is so deeply rooted in our conception of fairness that it is probably
encompassed in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
thus bringing state procedures within the ambit of federal protection.
However, the crucial issues concerning the scope and method of en-
forcement of this federal guarantee in state criminal proceedings have
not been decided.6
Right to a Speedy Trial in the Federal Courts
Paradoxically, while the Supreme Court has assumed the role of
umpire over state criminal prosecutions to protect various other rights
1 In re Begerow, 136 Cal. 293, 68 Pac. 773, 774 (1902); Wyoming v. Keefe, 17
Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122, 126 (1901); 1 Bouviers Law Diet. (Rawle's 3d Rev. 1914)
1333, title "Gaol Delivery."
2 31 Car. II, c. 2 (1680): "That every person committed for treason or felony
shall, if he requires it, the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next
session of oyer and terminer, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted
to bail, unless the King's witnesses cannot be produced at that time; and, if ac-
quitted, or if not indicted and tried in the second term or session, he shall be dis-
charged from his imprisonment for such imputed offense." Wyoming v. Keefe, 17
Wyo. 227, 98 Pac. 122, 126 (1908); In re Begerow, 133 Cal. 349, 65 Pac. 828, 829
(1901).
3 ll. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38, §748: "Any person committed for a criminal or
supposed criminal offense, and not admitted to bail, and not tried by- the court
having jurisdiction of the offense, within four months of the date of commitment,
shall be set at liberty by the, court, unless the delay shall happen on the application
of the prisoner, or unless the court is satisfied that due exertion has been made to
procure the evidence on the part of the People, and that there is reasonable grounds
to believe that such evidence may be procured at a later day in which case the court
may continue the cause for not more than sixty (60) days. If any such person shall
have been admitted to bail for an alleged offense, other than a capital offense, he
shall be entitled, on demand, to be tried within four months after such demand:
Provided, that if the court shall be satisfied that due exertion has been made to
procure the evidence on behalf of the People and that there is reasonable ground
to believe such evidence may be procured at a later day the court may continue the
cause for not more than sixty (60) days."
4 Most state constitutions provide for this right in almost identical terms. The
Constitution of Illinois provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to ... a speedy public trial .. ." Ill. Const. Art. II §9. Cf. covering
the right to a public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (secret contempt pro-
ceeding by judge acting as "one man grand jury" held to violate due process under
Fourteenth Amendment).
5 State v. Swain, 147 Ore. 207, 31 P. (2d) 745 (1934).




of the individual, the procedural rules governing the right to a speedy
trial in the federal courts afford the accused substantially less pro-
tection than is found in most state courts. The Sixth Amendment
has been construed to grant only a relative right to speedy trial
dependent upon the surrounding circumstances.7 Rule 48(b) of the
recently adopted Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure substantially
follows the rule established by federal case law which places the
dismissal for delay in prosecution solely in the discretion of the
trial court." The accused has no right to be discharged from custody
no matter how long the prosecution is delayed.9 His rights are limited
to making a demand on the trial court for a speedy trial; if that demand
is refused, he must petition the circuit court of appeals for a writ of
mandamus to compel the trial court to proceed with the trial.' 0 Before
the writ of mandamus will issue, the accused must show that the trial
court has abused its discretion in permitting the continued delay in
the prosecution of the case.": If the accused fails to take affirmative
steps to bring the case before the court and fully to prosecute his
demand for a speedy trial, he will be held to have acquiesced in the
delay and will be unable to prosecute any collateral attack upon such
a judgment on the grounds of a denial of his right to a speedy trial.,2
Furthermore, according to the federal rule, where the trial court has
dismissed the indictment for lack of prosecution, the dismissal does
not act as a bar to a subsequent indictment for the same offense, but
the accused continues to be subject to the hazard of an impending prose-
cution.'3
Right to a Speedy Trial in the State Courts
A few states follow the lead of the federal courts as to the scope and
method of securing the right to a speedy trial.' 4 There being no statutory
7 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77, 87 (1905).
8 18 USCA following §687 (Supp. 1947), Rule 48(b): "Dismissal: (b) By Court.
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing
an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district
court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court may
dismiss the indictment, information or complaint." United States v. McWilliams,
163 F. (2d) 695 (App. D.C. 1947) (where charges against defendants had been
pending for nearly four and one-half years, dismissal for lack of prosecution was
held to be within sound discretion of trial court; Edgerton, J., dissented).
9 Shepherd v. United States, 163 F. (2d) 974, 978 (C. C. A. 8th, 1947); Frankel v.
Woodrough, 7 F. (2d) 796, 798 (0. C. A. 8th, 1925).
1o Pietch v. United States, 110 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 10th, 1940); Daniels v.
United States, 17 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927); Shepherd v. United States, 163
F. (2d) 974 (C. C. A. 8th, 1947).
11 Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) (trial judge ordered
to show cause why mandamus should not issue to begin trial or dismiss indictment
where accused's demand for trial was refused because imprisoned under another
sentence); of. United States v. McWilliams, 163 F. (2d) 695 (App. D. C. 1947)
(trial judge held not to have abused discretion when he dismissed indictment almost
two years after mistrial and after several demands for trial made by defendant).
12 Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 10th, 1947); Phillips v. United
States, 201 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912).
13 Ex Parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106 (S. D. Cal. 1940).
14 In Michigan there is no statute supplementing the constitutional provision of
the right to a speedy trial and the procedure there is governed by judicial decisions.
People v. Foster, 246 Mich. 60, 246 N. W. 60 (1933); Note (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev.
1027. In Louisiana the same result is reached by statute: Louisiana Code of Crime
Procedure (Dart., 1943) Art. 320, "All persons accused of crime shall be entitled to
a speedy trial, and may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
enforce by mandamus this right."
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enactment defining and implementing the right granted by the consti-
tutions in these states, the right to be discharged for delay in prosecu-
tion has not been recognized. The accused is required to make demand
for a speedy trial; if no demand is made, he will be considered to have
waived his right; and where the demand for trial is refused, the ac-
cused's remedy is not to be discharged, but merely to bring an action
of mandamus against the trial court.15
M11ost of the states, however, have enacted statutes to supplement and
to give effect to the constitutional provision which preserve this right.
Though there seems to be little uniformity in the terms of these statutes,
they may be broadly classified into two groups on the basis of their
effect. First, there are those statutes which provide the broadest pro-
tection to the accused and which have been construed almost as statutes
of limitations; they may take effect without demand for trial by the
accused and operate as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. 16 The second classification consists of statutes which are not
so sweeping as the first group, but still give more protection than is
found in the federal courts.1 7 These statutes differ from the federal
rule in that the accused is given the right to secure his discharge from
custody or the dismissal of the indictment after a fixed period of delay
unless good cause to the contrary is shown to exist; but these statutes
also provide that, except in the case of misdemeanors, the discharge
or dismissal does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
This result is also reached in some states by construction of statutes
which do not spell out the effect of a discharge as to subsequent prose-
cution but are analogous in terms to statutes that are construed in other
states as statutes of limitations.'8 The running of the statutory period
does not automatically discharge the accused, but the accused must take
affirmative action to secure a trial or he will be held to have waived his
15 Hicks v. Boyne, Judge, 236 Mich. 689, 211 N. W. 35 (1926); People v. Den Uyl,
- Mich. -) 31 N. W. (2d) 699 (1948); People v. Foster, 246 Mich. 60, 246
N. W. 60 (1933); Note, (1933) 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1027; State v. Banks, 111 La. 22,
35 So. 370 (1903).
16 I. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 38 §748 (quoted, supra note 3); Indiana Stat. Anno.
(Bums, 1933) §9-1403-04; Virginia Code of 1942, §4926.
17 Cal. Pen. Code (Deering, 1941) §§1381-1387. "§1382. The Court, unless good
cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecution to be dismissed in the
following cases: 1. When a person has been held to answer for a public offense and
an information is not filed against him, within fifteen days thereafter. 2. If a de-
fendant, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not brought to
trial within sixty days after the finding of the indictment, or filing of the informa-
tion. . . . §1383. If the defendant is not charged or tried, as provided in the last
section, and sufficient reason therefor is shown, the court may order the action to be
continued from time to time, and in the meantime may discharge the defendant from
custody on his own undertaking of bail for his appearance to answer the charge at
the time to which the action is continued ..... §1384. If the court directs the action
to be dismissed, the defendant must, if in custody, be discharged therefrom; or if
admitted to bail, his bail is exonerated,... §1387. An order for the dismissal of the
action, as provided in this chapter, is a bar to any other prosecution for the same
offense, if it is a misdemeanor, ... ; but an order for dismissal of the action is not
a bar if the offense is a felony." See also Laws of New York (Thompson, 1939)
c. 442, §§667-673; 4.Rev. Stat. of Washington (Remington, 1931) §§2311-2315.
18 Colo. Stat. Anno. (1935) c. 48, §485; People v. Henwood, 65 Colo. 566, 179 Pac.
874 (1919) (discharge for failure to prosecute within statutory period will not bar
subsequent prosecution for same offense). Contra under analogous statute, Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1947) c. 38 §748 (quoted asupra note 3); People ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225
li. 347, 80 N. E. 291 (1907). Cf. Virginia Code of 1942, §4926, providing that an
accused shall be !'forever discharged".
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rights to a speedy trial. In California when the motion to dismiss is
refused and the accused is not discharged by the trial court, he may
petition for a writ of mandamus.19 However, the burden is on him to
show that the trial court has abused its discretion.2 0
Illinois is typical of the group of states where statutes provide the
broadest protection to the accused. The Illinois courts have so construed
the statute supplementing the constitutional provision for a speedy trial
that an accused has almost absolute protection from delays in prosecu-
tion. The Supreme Court of Illinois in applying the "Four Term" Act
has repeatedly reiterated that the statute is mandatory upon the trial
court and confers an absolute right on the accused which is not to be
evaded by technicalities.2 ' This general rule has been qualified, however,
by certain Illinois decisions.
In Guthman v. People2 2 it was established that where the defendant
was committed to the county jail by the police magistrate upon a mitti-
mus, the statutory period ran from the date of the defendant's incar-
ceration and not from the date on which the indictment was returned.
This precedent was followed in People v. Emblen,2 3 which held that the
police could not thwart the statute and the constitution by holding a man
without judicial order. An allegation that the defendant was merely
being held as a witness in another trial was not countenanced, but was
considered as a technical evasion of the statute. In this case two indict-
ments were returned against the defendants. The first charged him with
conspiracy to commit an assault; and the second, under which he was
tried and found guilty, charged him with assault with intent to commit
murder. It was held that the statute could not be avoided by the use
of two indictments which charged substantially the same offense.24 How-
ever, in People v. Stillwagon,25 the defendant had stolen a car in one
county and transported it to another where he was apprehended and
indicted for the crime of larceny. Subsequently, he was returned to
the custody of the police in the first county and held under an indict-
ment for robbery, the total time of his imprisonment prior to his trial
exceeding the four month limitation. The court, while stating that the
statute could not be evaded by technicalities, held that the crimes of
19 Ex Parte Alpine, 203 Cal. 731, 265 Pac. 947 (1928). The situation in California
seems to be confused as to the form in which the accused may seek relief where he
claims that his right to a speedy trial has been denied. Where the accused is held in
jail beyond the statutory period, he may petition for a writ of habeas corpus before
the trial to secure his discharge, Ex Parte Vinton, 5 Cal. App. 624, 47 Pac. 1019
(1897). Also, after a mistrial, In re Begerow, 136 Cal. 293, 68 Pac. 773 (1902). But
where the accused is on bail and submits to voluntary imprisonment, habeas corpus
will not lie, In re Ford, 160 Cal. 334, 116 Pac. 757 (1911). Where the trial court
overrules the defendant's motion to dismiss after the granting of a new trial, his
only remedy is to petition for a writ of mandamus, Ex Parte Alpine, 203 Cal. 731,
265 Pac. 947 (1928). But where the defendant is tried, convicted and sentenced, his
only remedy is by appeal, and not by habeas corpus.
20 Chrisman v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 477, 219 Pac. 85 (1923).
21 People v. Stillwagon, 373 Ill. 211, 25 N. E. (2d) 795 (1940); Note (1940) 31
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 80; People v. Schmagien, 361 Ill. 371, 198 N. E. 142
(1935). The Illinois statute is quoted supra, note 6.
22 203 Ill. 260, 67 N. E. 821 (1903).
23 362 Ill. 142, 199 N. E. 281 (1936); Note (1936) 26 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
937.
24 Newlin v. People, 221 Ill. 166, 77 N. E. 529 (1906).




larceny and robbery were distinguishable and that the statutory period
runs only from the time of incarceration in the county which has
jurisdiction of the offense.
Contrary to the rule in the federal courts, the defendant under the
Illinois "Four Term" Act is not required to make a demand for trial
where he has not been admitted to bail. 26 However, where the accused
is admitted to bail, a demand for trial is required to set the statute in
motion, 27 with the exception that where the accused is charged with a
capital offense and is admitted to bail, the statute does not apply.28
While a demand for trial is not always necessary, the accused must
raise the issue by a motion for discharge29 prior to the trial in order
to obtain the ruling of the trial court as to whether the conditions
justifying a delay exist; i.e., delay caused by application of the accused
or needed to procure evidence for the prosecution if it may be reason-
ably expected that such evidence may be procured.30 Consequently,
the accused may waive his right to speedy trial by failing to make the
motion for discharge or by withdrawing it prior to a ruling of the
trial court on the motion.31
If the motion for discharge for want of prosecution is sustained by
the trial court, the discharge will operate as a bar to subsequent com-
mitment for the same offense, 32 but it will not bar the prosecution for
other offenses growing out of the same transaction.33 The rules of
double jeopardy are applied in determining whether a subsequent prose-
cution is barred.34
The denial of the motion for discharge is not a final order and the
accused must proceed with the trial.35 Where the trial court has over-
ruled the defendant's motion and the trial results in a conviction, the
writ of error is the only method of review open to the accused in
26 People v. Grandstaff, 324 Ill. 70, 154 N. E. 448 (1926). The Illinois statute is
quoted stipra, note 6.
27 Peop:le v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, 110 N. E. 26 (1915); Meadoweraft v. People, 163
fI. 56, 45 N. E. 303 (1896).
28 People v. Maniatis, 297 Ill. 72, 130 N. E. 323 (1921).
29 The motion for discharge for want of prosecution seems to be peculiar to the
criminal procedure in Illinois. Its counterpart in civil practice is the motion for
dismissal for want of prosecution as to which there are four intrinsic features: (1)
The court has inherent power to grant this motion, there being no statutory provision
or court rule for it; (2) The motion may be made by the defendant or the court
may dismiss on its own motion; (3) Granting the motion is in the discretion of the
trial court; (4) The court may order a vacation of a dismissal that has been granted
in proper cases. 3 Nichols, Ill. Civil Practice (1941) §§2844-2856. In criminal pro-
cedure, while there is no statute or rule of court expressly governing the use of the
motion for discharge, its use in regard to the right to a speedy trial is limited by the
"Four Term" Act, which is said to be mandatory. Moreover, by judicial construc-
tion, a discharge under the statute is held to be a bar to subsequent prosecution for
the same offense, and therefore, the order granting the motion may not be vacated.
30 People v. Utterback, 385 Ill. 239, 52 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944).
31 Ibid; cf. Anno. 129 A. L. R. 572.
32 People ex rel. Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N. E. 291 (1907).
33 People v. Stillwagon, 373 Ill. 211, 25 N. B. (2d) 795 (1940) discussed in text
over note 25, .upra; Nagel v. People, 229 fI. 598, 82 N. E. 315 (1907).
34 People v. Allen, 368 Ill. 368, 14 N. E. (2d) 397 (1938) (accused, indicted for
killing a pedestrian in an automobile accident, was discharged under the "Four
Term" Act; discharge held not to be a bar to prosecution under subsequent indict-
ment for the death of another pedestrian also killed in the same accident).
35 People ex rel. Freeman v. Murphy, 212 fI1. 584, 72 N. E. 902 (1904).
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Illinois. 36 Although the twenty-year common law limitation applies
to this writ, its effectiveness, unless a bill of exceptions has been filed,
is circumscribed by restricting review to the common law record.3 7 But
on this record a conclusive presumption that the trial court acted
correctly and found conditions existed which justified the delay oper-
ates to preclude relief on the writ of error alone.s
It, therefore, becomes necessary to preserve the record of proceedings
upon the motion for discharge by filing a bill of exceptions,3 9 which
by rule of court must be certified by the trial judge within fifty days
of the rendition of the judgment.40 However, where a bill of exceptions
has been duly filed, and nothing appears in the record to indicate an
application for delay by the prisoner or by the prosecution, a presump-
tion will then operate in favor of the defendant sufficient to reverse
the conviction on the basis that the statutory right to a speedy trial is
mandatory and may not be disregarded.4 1
Although the Illinois "Four Term" Act is said to be mandatory and
create an absolute right to be discharged after the statutory period
has run, the expiration of the statutory period has been held not to
raise any jurisdictional defects in the proceedings in the trial court.42
Consistent with this position and its traditional holding as to the scope
of writ of habeas corpus, 43 the Illinois court has expressly held habeas
corpus may not be used to review the judgment of the trial court where
the right to be discharged has been denied.44 However, this position
conceivably may be reversed in view of recent dicta of the court which
indicates a possible enlargement of the scope of habeas corpus to review
an alleged denial of a constitutional right.45
36 Ibid; People v. Utterback, 385 Ill. 239, 52 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944). Habeas
corpus is proper method of obtaining review in some other states: Ex parte Miller,
66 Colo. 261, 180 Pac. 749 (1919) ; Ex Parte Blankenship, 93 W. Va. 408, 116 S. E.
751 (1923); Anno. 58 A. L. R. 1510.
37 Comment (1947) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 107, 118-131.
38 Daugherty v. People, 124 Ill. 557, 16 N. E. 852 (1888).
39 People v. Tait, 390 Ill. 272, 61 N. E. (2d) 166 (1945).
40 Supreme Court Rule of Practice and Procedure, fll. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 110
§259.74A.
41 People v. Schmagien, 361 Ill. 371, 198 N. E. (2d) 142 (1935).
42 People v. Utterback, 385 Ill. 239, 52 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944). But that the court
may lose jurisdiction where there has been delay in imposing sentence, see People
ex rel. Boehnert v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287, 61 N. E. 23 (1903); People v. Penn, 302
Ill. 488, 135 N. E. 92 (1922) (involving the Illinois probation statute: Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1947) c. 38 §784 et seq.).
43 People ex rel. Crowe v. Williams, Judge, 330 Ill. 150, 161 N. E. 312 (1928);
for more cases see Comment (1947) 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 139; (1947) 42
Ill. L. Rev. 329.
44 People ex rel. Freeman v. Murphy, 212 Ill. 584, 72 N. E. 902 (1904); of. People
v. Utterback, 385 Ill. 239, 52 NT. B. (2d) 775 (1944). But in Illinois where defend-
ant has been discharged under "Four Term" Act, habeas corpus is proper mode
of relief from imprisonment on a reindictment for the same offense, People ex rel.
Nagel v. Heider, 225 Ill. 347, 80 N. E. 291 (1907).
45 According to the authorities cited supra, note 43, it had been generally accepted
in Illinois that habeas corpus would only lie to attack jurisdiction. But several recent
developments may indicate that Illinois has adopted a more liberal approach towards
the scope of habeas corpus in the state proceedings. In Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S.
561 (1947), the state courts had denied habeas corpus to an immigrant who in 1925
at the age of 18, allegedly without advice of counsel and without the services of an
adequate interpreter, had been convicted of murder. While making the concession,
to some surprising, that habeas corpus would lie in proper cases, the attorney general
did not explain as clearly as might be desired what would be a proper case. See Mr.
(Vol. 39
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Collateral Attack in the Federal Courts
In a recent case, United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen,46 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to intervene in a collateral attack by
habeas corpus on an Illinois judgment where the petitioner had waited
thirty-nine years after his trial to seek relief. The facts of the case
were that the petitioner had been brought to trial in 1907, four months
and twenty-five days after his arrest. A motion for discharge for want
of prosecution was duly made before the trial started, but was overruled
by the trial court. Oral evidence was presented in the habeas corpus
proceedings tending to establish that the delay was due to the negligence
of the prosecution.41 The trial proceeded and the petitioner was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner
had insisted that his counsel not prosecute any appeal (presumably for
fear of possible death penalty upon a retrial), and consequently, no
review of the judgment was perfected and no bill of exceptions was
filed. Under these circumstances the Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the petition for habeas corpus as not justifying intervention by a federal
court. The decision appears to be based on the waiver of the petitioner's
right" to be discharged by his failure to exhaust his state remedies
at the time such remedies were available to him. 49 However, in answer-
Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion, id. at 567. Subsequently the Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. Wilson, - Ill. -, 78 N. E. (2d) 514, 521 (1948); and People v.
Shoffner, - Ill. -, 79 N. E. (2d) 200, 202 (1948) uttered some dicta which may
well have been intended to suggest the availability of habeas corpus in certain in-
stances in which there had been a denial of a substantial federal constitutional right.
The Williams and Shaffner cases were urged upon the United States Supreme Court
in Loftus v. Illinois, - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct. 1212 (1948) as establishing that habeas
corpus is the proper remedy in cases in which there has been a denial of due process
where the facts constituting the error were known to the trial judge at the time of
conviction.
46 166 F. (2d) 608 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948).
47 Counsel. who defended the petitioner in the trial in 1907 testified in the habeas
corpus proceeding that when the motion for discharge was filed, the state's attorney
offered to make a deal in return for the withdrawal of the motion and the entrance
of a plea of guilty. When the offer was rejected by the defendant, the state's
attorney stated he would have the case go to the Supreme Court, even though at
that time there was no basis upon which the state could prosecute an appeal. Testi-
mony further established that the offense was the murder of a policeman, that
"feeling was running pretty high at the time," that application for change of
venue was denied, and that the defendant refused to give his counsel permission
to appeal the ruling on the motion for fear that "there might be something done
there where they granted a new trial."
48 The dissenting opinion took the position that there was a distinction between
waiving the right to be discharged and waiving the right to appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Regardless of whether or not the trial court lost jurisdiction, the
"Four Term" Act created a mandatory duty upon the trial court and gave the
defendant an absolute right which was denied to him; and therefore, he was entitled
to be discharged even though he could not appeal to the Illinois court. It is inter-
esting to note that the dissent finds that there was no waiver because of failure
to file a bill of exceptions, because the common law record was sufficient to establish
the petitioner's right to be discharged. This contradicts the position taken by the
Illinois Supreme Court that in the absence of a bill of exceptions the common law
record will be presumed to sustain the trial court's ruling, &upra note 37.
49 The exhaustion of remedies doctrine as pronounced in Ex Parte Hawk, 321 U. S.
114 (1943), requires that 'a petitioner exhaust all state remedies prior to obtaining
relief in the federal courts from a judgment of a state court. This rule has some-
times been interpreted as requiring more than the exhaustion of present state
remedies; the petitioner must have exhausted his state remedies while they were
1948]
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ing the contention of the petitioner that the trial court had lost juris-
diction and that the conviction was therefore void, the decision used
language which indicates a regression from the approach adopted by
the Supreme Court concerning the scope of habeas corpus.50 Citing
some older decisions by the Supreme Court to sustain its position,51
the Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to adopt the narrow concept of
jurisdiction followed until recently by the Illinois Supreme Court.52
The court, however, did not reject the petition for habeas corpus on
the grounds of jurisdiction, but held that the facts which would seem
to establish a waiver did not justify federal intervention.
In examining the possibility of collateral attack in the federal courts
upon a state criminal proceeding by petition for a writ of habeas corpus
on the grounds of the denial of the constitutional right to a speedy
trial, the basic problem is the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Unquestionably, it is a fundamental right of which recognition is requi-
site to fairness and of which denial might seriously prejudice an accused.
Consequently, although there are no cases that establish the proposition,
the Fourteenth Amendment perhaps could be invoked to secure the
right to a speedy trial in state criminal proceedings.53 But it is
questionable whether the right to a speedy trial, if embraced by the
Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to discharge from all further
prosecution. There seem to be three possible answers to this question.
First, the position might well be taken that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not guarantee anything more than is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, which though it reserves the right to a speedy trial has
been construed as not carrying with it the right to be discharged where
a speedy trial has been denied.54 The argument is, of course, that if
available or justify his failure to do so. See Wade v. Mayo, - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct.
1270, 1282"(1948) (Reed, J., dissenting); Note (1948) 61 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 666.
Accord, Goto v. Lane, 265 U. S. 393 (1924). A failure to exhaust state remedies
in the proper time may be justified where state procedures have not been sufficiently
delineated to enable an accused to know what his proper state remedy is. See
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U. S. 561, 563 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). Compare,
Loftus v. Illinois, - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct. 1212 (1948). The requirement that all
state remedies be exhausted, Ex Parte Hawk, supra, has been modified by Wade v.
Mayo, supra, where it was held that "the exhaustion of but one of several avail-
able alternatives is all that is necessary," id. at 1273, and also that it was not
necessary in all cases to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari to review a state
court judgment.
50 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U. S. 101, 104-105 (1942) (habeas corpus will issue
not only where "conviction is void for want of jurisdiction . . . It extends also to
those exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused.
51 Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U. S. 442 (1910) ; Matter of Gregory, 219 U. S. 210
(1911).
52 Compare the Illinois cases cited in note 43 supra with those cited in note 45,
supra.
53 The state's brief in United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F. (2d) 608
(C.C.A. 7th, 1948), conceded this much: "The only command of the Fourteenth
Amendment (we concede that such command can probably be inferred from the due
process clause) is that the accused is entitled to a reasonably speedy and public'
trial." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948) (denial of a public trial by a state court
held to violate due process of Fourteenth Amendment).
54 Cases cited supra footnote 9. But see, Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46,
123 (1947), (Murphy, J., dissenting): "I agree that the specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But I am not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and necessarily
limited by the Bill of Rights."
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the Fourteenth Amendment were held to embrace the right to be dis-
charged after a statutory period of delay, then the rule in the federal
court would not be in accord with due process. United States ex rel.
Hanson v. Ragen55 appears to be the only case in which federal inter-
vention has been sought on the grounds of a denial of the right to a
speedy trial. Though this argument was raised, the majority opinion
did not pass upon the issue, but may have indicated its position by
citing two cases construing the Sixth Amendment.56
A second position could be taken that where a state has enacted a
statute which seeks to enforce the right to a speedy trial by providing
for a mandatory right of discharge after a specified delay in prosecution,
due process requires that the trial court afford the accused the protec-
tion granted by the statute. A state may provide the accused more
protection than would be required by the Sixth Amendment or by due
process, but whatever procedure a state may adopt to implement the
right to a speedy trial, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that it
operate fairly and uniformly. 57 Hence, an arbitrary refusal to dis-
charge an accused where he is so entitled under a statute such as the
"Four Term" Act would be a denial of due process of law. This latter
position is tenable and appears to have been assumed without discussion
by the dissent in United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen.58 But it would
preclude federal intervention in state proceedings in states that follow
the federal rule or do not grant an absolute right of discharge for
want of prosecution, perhaps evenin cases which warrant intervention.
On the other hand, it would operate inexorably where there is a statute
such as the Illinois "Four Term" Act and commit the federal courts
to intervention whenever the statutory period has run and the accused
has not waived his right to be discharged. It could conceivably operate
to defeat justice and law enforcement where the prosecution can justify
the delay and the accused has not been prejudiced materially.
The third and soundest position from the standpoint of flexibility is
to measare the due process guarantee not by reference to the Sixth
Amendment nor by reference to any particular statutory requirements,
but by the concept of the fairness of the ensuing trial. "As in all long
delayed cases, the witnesses now are scattered; some are not accessible,
more particularly to the defendants who are without funds; the mem-
ories of witnesses as to events occurring many years ago are not clear.
It is for these reasons among others that the Constitution of the United
55 166 P. (2) 608 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948).
56 Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U. S. 77 (1904); Daniels v. United States, 17 F. (2d)
339 (C.C.A. 9th, 1927).
57 Apparently this position was also assumed by the district court at the hearing
on habeas proceedings. See Transcript of Record, pp. 81-82, filed in circuit court
of appeals, Mar. 13, 1947. "By Mr. Cunningham: Where is the Federal question
involved herel
By the Court: Due process of law is all I see.
By Mr. Schwartz: There is no due process involved here at all, because we are
interpreting a State statute, to wit, the 4-Term statute.
By the Court: I do not think you can use it this way with one person, and that
way with another person."
But of., Gryger v. Burke, - U. S. -, 68 S. Ct. 1256, 1258 (1948) where it is
stated: We cannot treat a mere error of state law, if one occurred, as a denial of
due process. "
58 166 F. (2d) 608, 612 (C.C.A. 7th, 1948), supra note 46.
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